Note & Recensioni by ,
Aisthesis. Pratiche, linguaggi e saperi dell'estetico 10 (1): 173-180, 2017
Firenze University Press 
www.fupress.com/aisthesisAisthesis
ISSN 2035-8466 (online) | DOI: 10.13128/Aisthesis-20916
Citation: AAVV (2017) Note & Recen-
sioni. Aisthesis 1(1): 173-180. doi: 
10.13128/Aisthesis-20916
Received: December 15, 2016
Accepted: April 15, 2017
Published: July 11, 2017
Copyright: © 2017 AAVV.This is an 
open access, peer-reviewed article 
published by Firenze University Press 
(http://www.fupress.com/aisthesis) and 
distribuited under the terms of the 
Creative Commons Attribution License, 
which permits unrestricted use, distri-
bution, and reproduction in any medi-
um, provided the original author and 
source are credited.
Data Availability Statement: All rel-
evant data are within the paper and its 
Supporting Information files.
Competing Interests: The authors 
have declared that no competing inter-
ests exist.
Note & Recensioni
Aby Warburg, Fragmente zur Ausdruckskunde [Carmen Metta] • Karin 
Nohr, Sebastian Leikert, Zum Phänomen der Rührung in Psychoanalyse 
und Musik [Michele Gardini] • Claudia Muth, Marius Raab, Claus-Chris-
tian Carbon, The stream of experience when watching artistic movie; Ben-
no Belke, Helmut Leder, Claus-Christian Carbon, When challenging art 
gets liked [Gianluca Consoli] 
A. Warburg, Fragmente zur Ausdruckskunde, ed. by U. Pfisterer, 
H. Ch. Hönes, in Aby Warburg Gesammelte Schriften. Studien-
ausgabe, IV, De Gruyter, Berlin 2015, pp. 372.
Any attempt to review Aby Warburg’s Fragmente zur Ausdruck-
skunde edited in 2015 by U. Pfisterer and H.Ch. Hönes should also 
take into account the edition of Warburg’s Frammenti sull’espressione/
Grundlegende Bruchstücke zu einer pragmatischen Ausdruckskunde 
edited in 2011 by Susanne Müller (It. tr. by M. Ghelardi, G. Targia, 
Edizioni della Normale, Pisa) as well as the relative debate that has 
been involving the editors so far. 
Whereas the edition Fragmente zur Ausdruckskunde includes 
Warburg’s Grundlegende Bruchstücke (1888-1896/1905-1912) as the 
most relevant among other texts (Bemerkungen zu Heinrich Wölf-
flin. Reinassance und Barock, 1888 [1889-1891], Vier Thesen [1892-
1906], Symbolismus als Umfangsbestimmung [1896-1901]) concern-
ing «Symboltheorie, Kunstpsychologie» and «Einfühlungsästhe-
tik» (Vorbemerkung, p. IX), the edition Frammenti sull’espressione is 
entirely devoted to the Grundlegende Bruchstücke. 
As a matter of fact, the editing issues, currently being debated, 
are concerned with the way the editors have brought genetic criti-
cism to bear on the edition of the Bruchstücke. 
The two bound books (Hefte), known as Grundlegende Bruch-
stücke I and II (WIA III.43.1.1 and WIA III.43.2.1), are the hand-
written transcriptions of Warburg’s autograph cards AE Aphorismen 
chronolog. geordnet (Zettelkästen [Index Card Boxes] WIA ZK [23]). 
While fragments 1-117a had been transcribed by Warburg himself, 
in 1901 he committed fragments 118-422 to copyist Hermine Streib-
er, who was accordingly entrusted with the copy of further ones 
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(Grundlegende Bruchstücke II). Both transcriptions 
would have been amended, commented and inte-
grated by Warburg.
The main topic of discussion among the 
editors being whether a critical edition of the 
Grundlegende Bruchstücke should stick to War-
burg’s autograph only, as Susanne Müller claims; 
or transcriptions as such should be considered 
not just as a mere copy, rather as the best possible 
approximation of the definitive text, as maintained 
by the editors of the Fragmente.
The harsh critique of U. Pfisterer and H.Ch. 
Hönes, who do not agree with Müller’s inter-
pretation of the principle of the “last hand”, 
was delivered in the Nachwort (pp. 324-325) to 
their edition of the Fragmente, and may be con-
densed as follows: Hermine Streiber’s transcrip-
tion (Abschrift) is not a mere “copy” (Kopie) of 
the Aphorismen, all the more that Warburg had 
been long adding comments in the margin and 
reviewing it. Moreover, since the structure of the 
text edited by Müller «follows the text construc-
tion of the bound books, which in some cases 
deviates from the sequence of the cards in the 
index card box (folgt dem Textaufbau der Hefte, 
der an manchen Stellen von der Abfolge der Zet-
tel im Kasten abweicht)» (Das Wasserzeichen des 
Gedankens, in Frammenti sull’espressione, p. 11; 
quoted in Nachwort, p. 325), she would arbitrar-
ily combine: «a level of transmission – that of 
the Index card boxes – with a later version of the 
same text – its transcription in bound notebooks 
– (eine Überlieferungsebene – der Zettelkästen 
– mit einer späteren Fassung desselben Textes 
– seiner Abschrift in gebundenen Notizbüchern 
–)» (Nachwort, p. 325). Reason for adopting the 
structure of the bound books being for Müller 
that the author himself had «changed the order 
of succession [of the cards], [had] left some 
cards untranslated and [had] put both thematic 
sections of Aphorismen on Symbol on the right 
side next to the texts of the same period (ihre 
Reihenfolge änderte, einige Zettel nicht abschrei-
ben ließ und die beiden thematischen Faszikel 
mit den Aphorismen zum Symbol rechtsseitig 
neben die gleichzeitig entstandenen Texte stellte» 
(Das Wasserzeichen des Gedankens, Frammenti 
sull’espressione, p. 11). 
In a brief note in the margin of her recent 
French edition of the Bruchstücke, Fragments sur 
l’expression (L’écarquillé, Paris 2015, p. 28) rest-
ing on the same assumptions as the German-
Italian edition, Susanne Müller distances her-
self from the «methodological mistakes (erreurs 
méthodologiques)» of the German editors, their 
«noncompliance to textual authority (non-respect 
de l’autorité textuelle)» and «misuse of genetic crit-
icism (un usage erroné de la critique génétique)», 
while referring the reader to a yet-to-come cir-
cumstantial comment.
Here we can only attempt a conciliation 
between the two positions, hazarding that the 
“authorized” transcriptions of Warburg’s manu-
script, moreover largely incorrect, cannot lay 
claim to full “authority”, but still are evidence of 
Warburg’s painstaking work toward completion.
However, as the Bruchstücke appear to be more 
a «transparent palimpsest» (Nachwort, p. 329) than 
the posthumous re-elaboration of a pre-existent 
matter, German editors place emphasis on the gen-
esis of the text in a documented critical apparatus, 
Nachwort and Sachkommentar, while reporting in 
the footnotes major variants between the manu-
script AE Aphorismen, Bruchstücke I and II, and 
the so-called Safekopie [WIA III.44] – a second 
transcription of Grundlegende Bruchstücke I and II, 
corrected by Warburg and stored in a safe deposit 
– : that Warburg had had some inter-textual spaces 
left empty, being evidence that he laid claim to the 
“creative” property of the transcription. 
All things considered, the opportunity for 
gaining new insight into Warburg’s thought 
through the study of the fragments would deserve 
greater attention, as they contribute to prepare the 
philosophical foundation of modern Bildwissen-
schaft (see J.M. Krois, Cassirer’s “Symbolic Values” 
and Philosophical Iconology, «Cassirer Studies», I 
(2008), pp. 101-117). Notwithstanding the most 
recent studies focusing on Warburg’s early works 
(see Nachwort, note 11, p. 325), there has not 
been after all much theoretical effort to disclose 
the role of the fragments in the understanding of 
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early iconology as a “philosophical iconology” (see 
C. Metta, Per una iconologia filosofica. I Fram-
menti sull’espressione di Aby Warburg, «Bruniana 
& Campanelliana», XX (2014/2), pp. 403-414). In 
particular, the inclusion of the problem of myth in 
the science of images must have persuaded War-
burg of a possible convergence between his “prag-
matic science of expression” and Ernst Cassirer’s 
theory of expressive function around the idea of 
a «general science of culture as the doctrine of 
man’s affective existence (allgemeine Kulturwis-
senschaft als Lehre vom bewegten Menschen)» (see 
“Aby Warburg an Ernst Cassirer, 2. Februar 1923”, 
in E. Cassirer, Briefe. Ausgewählter wissenschaftli-
cher Briefwechsel, hrsg. von J.M. Krois, ECN, Bd. 
18, Meiner, Hamburg 2009), far before Cassirer’s 
theory of mythical thought developed into a “logic 
of the sciences of culture”. 
The same insistence on the “pragmatic” char-
acter of culture resounds in the third and last 
title Warburg gave to his collection of aphorisms 
in 1912: Grundlegende Bruchstücke zu einer prag-
matischen Ausdruckskunde. The syntagma “prag-
matische Ausdruckskunde” seems to allow a cul-
tural, thus wider, acceptation of Warburg’s thought 
than the replaced titles Grundlegende Bruchstücke 
zu einer psychologischen Kunstphilosophie and 
Grundlegende Bruchstücke zu einer monistischen 
Kunstpsychologie, in that the former lends credit 
to the assumption that expression is the universal 
function of culture, in which art has a major role 
that no mere psychological approach is able to 
describe as such.
Whereas, however, the hesitation between phi-
losophy and psychology appears to be more a sign 
of the times (from Darwin’s The Origin of Species 
and Fechner’s Elemente der Psychophysik to the 
encounter with the Pueblo culture, this latter mak-
ing Warburg say he had finally found out a formula 
for the “psychological law” he had been looking 
for since 1888), the oscillation between a pragmat-
ic science and a monistic one is worth reflection. 
A monistic psychology of art would have perhaps 
allowed too much to a metaphysical interpretation 
and too little to a strictly psychological one, end-
ing by relinquishing the role of perception as the 
place for expression and inter-subjectivity: When 
it comes to art, the question is why and how we 
happen to perceive images as if they were alive. 
One answer could be they seem to be alive; anoth-
er one, they are alive. If we assume that they seem 
to be alive, we also assume that they are not; if we 
assume that they are alive, we also assume that they 
seem to be lacking life, appearance being the object 
of expression, while reality the object of represen-
tation. As, however, the mythical question arouses 
when it deals with giving sense to the absence of 
life, to Ausdrucksloses, we must assume that the 
absence of life, the Ausdrucksloses is the presup-
position of our need for perceiving life in what 
lacks it, in this case the work of art. As soon as the 
other’s mind hiding behind the work begins act-
ing as an overpowering will subjugating the image 
itself, it happens to perceive the image as the result 
of perception rather than its cause. Not just of the 
I’s perception indeed, but the other’s. As far as we 
perceive the action as independent from us, we 
perceive life as the other’s life. When we eventually 
gain power over things, then we perceive them as 
depending on us. Here we happen to “lose appear-
ances”: our identification with the object of our rep-
resentation, our lived life (Erlebnis), confines us to 
the expressionless world of symbols inhabiting our 
memory like for-ever-lost experiences.
In the opportunity that the I estranges itself 
in the world of meanings, in his distancing it, is 
also a chance for it to perceive life as duration and 
temporality. Art plays a major role in this regard, 
as it provides a non-conventional example of 
“work”, whose author we come to know by means 
of his work, not vice versa.
The text at stake was first published in 2009 
in Symbol - Grundlagentexte aus Ästhetik, Poetik 
und Kulturwissenschaft (ed. by F. Berndt and H.J. 
Drügh, De Gruyter, Berlin), and later included in 
Aby Warburg, Werke in einem Band (ed. by M. 
Treml, S. Weigel and P. Ladwig, Suhrkamp, Berlin 
2010). It was conceived during Warburg’s trip to 
America and carried on until 1901.
Its schematic character is explicitly intended 
to convey a somewhat definitive, mathematized 
truth. 
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“Symbolism as the determination of bound-
aries” attempts to sketch a casuistry of the I’s 
estrangement in the world, his inorganic spatial 
expansion leading to the loss of its self-identity of 
living, factual being. The incipit sounds program-
matic: symbolism means determination of exten-
sion (Umfangsbestimmung/Längsrichtungsbestim-
mung) and thus of direction (Richtungsbestim-
mung) (p. 299). As such it is comparable with the 
function of gravity (Schwerkraft). Like the function 
of gravity, symbolism acts as a force determining 
extension and direction of the spiritual world (geis-
tiger Haushalt). As, however, gravity is a physical 
concept, should we consider the determination of 
extension in a physical rather than logic accepta-
tion? After all, the determination of extension is 
concerned with the possibility to experience the 
bodily distance from the object repeatedly and 
therefore ideally. Moreover, man’s subjugation to 
gravity implies his physical resistance to the pres-
sure of symbolism, entailing the strenuous defence 
of his verticality. This very condition of being 
always at risk of losing one’s balance, one’s stand-
ing position (of stillness), one’s self-consciousness 
and feeling of distance between oneself and the 
object (see p. 298: «Verlust [1. des Standortes (der 
Ruhe) 2. des Ichbewußtseins] des Distanzgefühles 
zwischen […] Objekt u. Subject») makes the use 
of instruments necessary for the human being to 
encompass its limits. Ornament (Schmuck), tool 
(Gerät), possession (Besitz), figurative art (bil-
dende Kunst) are all different ways to the distanc-
ing of the object: sublation of distance (Aufhebung 
der Entfernung), distance within reach (Entfernung 
in Greifnähe), distance tout court (Entfernung). As 
soon as incorporation removes distance, the latter 
is soon regained as consciousness (of the distance) 
and promptly archived as memory. 
Less concerned with the above texts – but as 
much pregnant – are the notes to Heinrich Wölf-
flin’s dissertation Reinassance und Barock (WIA 
III.57.2.9.1) published for the first time. They tes-
tify to Warburg’s peculiar attitude to paraphrase 
single words or expressions from the books he 
read in an effort to translate them in his own lan-
guage, as if to appropriate them. As a consequence 
of his consideration of the “text” as a living organ-
ism, he takes blank spaces as culture medium of 
thought. Like images, words set in motion once 
they are put in relation with time.
When it comes to an autograph text like the 
Four Theses, Warburg is faced with the evidence 
that one’s own work can suddenly turn into some-
thing independent at all: the heavily corrected 
autograph version (WIA III.39.5.2) and the print-
ed one (WIA III.40.1.1) re-elaborated twice (WIA 
III.40.1.1 no. 2 and WIA III.40.1.1 no. 3), show 
that Warburg could hardly imagine to license a 
text that would be expected to present in a defini-
tive shape the very core of his dissertation - and 
this is as much true for the Grundlegende Bruch-
stücke, which are the core of his thought. 
The four theses can be condensed further as 
follows: 
1. The treatment of dynamism in art entails 
the distancing from the real milieu of the still-
image already dynamic; 2. This estrangement calls 
for symbolization, as far as symbolization implies 
a confrontation with the real milieu; 3. Symboli-
zation is a kind of idealization brought forth by 
means of confrontation between memory and 
impression; 4. The artistic imagination is the reac-
tion of our mind to gravity.
The invisible fracture between image of the 
senses and image of memory, the irreducibility of 
space and time within our perception, are finally 
made visible in the work of art as duration and life.
Table of contents: Dank, p. VII; Editorische 
Vorbemerkung, p. IX; 1. Grundlegende Bruch-
stücke [1888/1896-1905/1912], p. 1; 2. Bemerkun-
gen zu Heinrich Wölfflin, Renaissance und Barock, 
1888 [1889-1891], p. 273; 3. Vier Thesen [1892-
1906], p. 285; 4. Symbolismus als Umfangsbestim-
mung [1896-1901], p. 295; Nachwort: Der “kleine 
Antennerich” – Kunstpsvchologie als Selbsterkund-
ung als Kunstpsychologie, p. 321; Verzeichnis der 
abgekürzt zitierten Literatur, p. 353; Abbildung-
snachweise, p. 357; Personenindex, p. 359.
Ulrich Pfisterer is Professor of History of Art 
at the Institut für Kunstgeschichte of the Ludwig-
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Maximilians-Universität München  (since 2006) 
and Director of the Zentralinstitut für Kunst-
geschichte of the LMU München (since 2015)
Hans Christian Hönes is Research Associate 
on the Bilderfahrzeuge – Warburg’s Legacy and the 
Future of Iconology project at The Warburg Insti-
tute of London (since 2014).
Carmen Metta
K. Nohr, S. Leikert (ed.), Zum Phänomen der 
Rührung in Psychoanalyse und Musik, Psychoso-
zial-Verlag, Giessen 2016, pp. 190.
Il fenomeno emotivo della commozione è per 
più ragioni uno sfortunato apolide. Esiliato trop-
po a lungo tra le pagine di una popolare e medio-
cre letteratura romantica o decadente, praticato 
dunque con un certo pudore e un vago senso di 
colpa dalle cosiddette persone colte, non ha mai 
trovato – nonostante la sua evidente universali-
tà – una giusta udienza presso discipline come la 
psicoanalisi, l’antropologia o la musicologia, che 
pure avrebbero avuto tutto il diritto e dovere (e 
quali altre mai, se non proprio esse?) di prenderlo 
in carico. Freud non ne fa parola. Nella lista degli 
affetti fondamentali stilata da Ekman non compa-
re, né sorte molto migliore ha in ulteriori tentativi 
di sistematizzare teoricamente i fenomeni emotivi. 
La musicologia, specialmente se ispirata dal for-
malismo di Hanslick, tende ovviamente a guardar-
lo con degnazione e fastidio, quasi fosse materia 
da terza pagina.
Un recente convegno della Deutsche Gesell-
schaft für Psychoanalyse und Musik, i cui con-
tributi sono raccolti nel volume qui recensito, ha 
tentato meritoriamente di colmare, per quanto 
possibile, la lacuna e di rievocare il rimosso. Esso 
fa seguito ad altri convegni e, rispettivamente, ad 
altri volumi, tutti pubblicati dall’editore specializ-
zato Psychosozial-Verlag, che nel mondo tedesco 
svolge – fra l’altro – l’importante funzione di pro-
muovere e mediare  l’approfondimento dei poco 
esplorati rapporti tra musica e psicoanalisi. Natu-
ralmente, come sempre accade nel caso di atti di 
convegni, il risultato finale non corrisponde a uno 
studio organico. I contributi sono ovviamente 
molto diversi per provenienza (psicoanalisi, psi-
cologia, neurologia, musicologia, letteratura…), 
ampiezza e valore, e più che un affresco compiu-
to tracciano le forme di un mosaico ancora par-
zialmente indeterminato e incompleto, più fine in 
certi punti e più grossolano in altri. Probabilmen-
te, allo stato delle cose, non è ancora possibile fare 
molto di più.
Questa recensione non potrà toccare, per 
ragioni di spazio, tutti i singoli saggi, e trascure-
rà in particolare quelli più applicativi, cercando 
in cambio di ritrovare, nella varietà a volte irri-
ducibile degli approcci, almeno un sottile filo d’A-
rianna e una comune suggestione. Dopo un pri-
mo contributo di carattere soprattutto letterario, 
una specie di premessa un po’ estranea al resto 
e concentrata sull’importanza dell’“attimo” esi-
stenzialmente pregnante (proustiano) nello sca-
tenamento del fenomeno emotivo in questione 
(Gidion), e un secondo saggio di tenore comple-
tamente opposto, che connette scientificamente il 
“brivido” della commozione nell’ascolto musicale 
a una serie di vantaggi evolutivi, come l’attivazio-
ne dopaminergica che regola l’attenzione, sostiene 
la motivazione e favorisce il consolidamento della 
memoria episodica e procedurale (Altenmüller), il 
seguito del volume sembra sempre più concentrar-
si sul carattere relazionale proprio dell’esperienza 
di ascolto musicale. La musica appare, fenome-
nologicamente, portatrice di una serie di caratteri 
emotivi, come una “quasi-persona” che ci inter-
pella. Nella relazione diadica ascoltatore-suono, 
in quanto riconducibile ontogeneticamente alle 
prime interazioni sonore tra bambino e madre e 
in seguito al mondo relazionale dell’individuo, va 
correttamente collocato anche il fenomeno della 
commozione.
Contro l’opinione di Lacan (e in fondo dello 
stesso Freud), va riconosciuto pieno diritto a un 
doppio registro della soggettività: accanto a quel-
lo verbale, quello sensibile/cinetico che si estrin-
seca particolarmente nella musica. Qui, mentre 
un minimo di ripetizione delle forme è necessa-
rio per generare nel fruitore confidenza sufficien-
te ad abbandonare il terreno sicuro del linguag-
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gio e immergersi nell’incerto fiume percettivo, lo 
“schiacciamento” analogico sulle coazione a ripe-
tere freudiana risulterebbe tuttavia frettoloso e 
incauto. Il tipo specifico di ripetizione musicale è 
anzi ciò che, “orficamente”, spezza nelle sue figu-
re mitiche (Tantalo, Sisifo) la coazione a ripetere 
pulsionale del mondo infero e apre in suo luogo 
uno spazio utopico (Leikert: 133). La commozio-
ne è, per così dire, l’“immagine mobile” di questo 
spazio, il momento in cui cade la “cattiva” ripeti-
zione e osiamo superare la barriera fra noi e ciò 
che ci sta di fronte. Per questo, pur nella marcata 
somiglianza esteriore dei sintomi, la commozione 
è fenomenologicamente l’opposto della vergogna: 
benché entrambe presuppongano il riconoscimen-
to, quest’ultima chiude la soggettività in sé e nella 
propria prigione corporea, reificandola e negando-
le la trascendenza. La commozione, al contrario, 
sostiene la fiducia grazie alla quale il soggetto, tra-
scendendo sé e la propria differenza, muove verso 
l’Altro (Nohr).
Certamente, il puro e semplice sincronismo 
dei suoni, degli atti e delle intenzioni merita – 
in quanto artificioso e dunque potenzialmente 
“sospetto” – di essere criticamente indagato dal-
la psicoanalisi. Tanto nella vita quanto nel setting 
terapeutico, non necessariamente la (troppo) pre-
cisa corrispondenza diadica è sintomo di evolu-
zione positiva e di salute. Essa, al contrario, può 
risultare un mimetismo patologico e nocivo al 
libero sviluppo della personalità (Krause: 64), i 
cui sistemi relazionali devono risultare dialettici 
e non – appunto – mimetici, quasi fossero l’infi-
nita replicazione – questa sì coatta – di tautologie 
vuote. È un peccato, a nostro parere, che l’autore 
non abbia colto proprio qui il preciso corrispetti-
vo musicale del suo modello psicoanalitico: quel 
sentimentalismo fatto di una troppo prevedibile, 
facile, immediata, dunque “cattiva” corrispondenza 
con una cattiva musica di consumo che a propria 
volta lo replica e alimenta, e i cui caratteri incon-
fondibili sono stati altrove individuati ed elencati 
con non comune finezza da Roger Scruton.
Se dunque la musica è per eccellenza l’arte 
dell’aspettativa e del suo adempimento – realizza-
to, differito o eluso –, il sincronismo vissuto non si 
realizza nella sua verità esistenziale in forme sem-
plici e immediate, come un amalgama indifferen-
ziato. Il “brivido” fusionale di commozione nasce al 
contrario quando un’aspettativa viene sì adempiuta, 
una corrispondenza col mondo realizzata, ma in 
modo sorprendente, benché non eccessivo (Nohr: 
148 s.), quasi che solo allora, nel cuore stesso di 
quest’esperienza vissuta, ci si rendesse conto con 
sorpresa e meraviglia di cosa davvero si aspettava. 
E se la commozione è una forma di conoscenza di 
sé – proprio nel momento paradossale in cui il sé 
rinuncia alla rigidità del proprio perimetro –, essa 
nello specifico passa dalle mani di un Altro ipercri-
tico (un Super-io persecutorio, oppure il “sabotato-
re interno” di Fairbairn) a quelle di un Altro bene-
volo e partecipativo (149). Dalle Erinni alle Eume-
nidi, verrebbe da dire ancora in termini mitici.
Un percorso che attraversi con pazienza e atten-
zione questi complessi contributi ritrova infine, per 
così dire, la premessa fondamentale che sottende 
la loro intera, variegata proposta: l’inadeguatezza 
del modello epistemologico monadico di Freud a 
rendere giustizia dei ricchi e profondi rapporti che 
intercorrono tra psiche e suono, dunque anche tra 
psicoanalisi e musica. La “sordità” musicale della 
psicoanalisi classica trova qui una spiegazione sod-
disfacente. Come il nostro psichismo, così anche la 
musica può al contrario vivere solo se immersa in 
«scene d’interazione», composte di soggetti, ogget-
ti, credenze, aspettative e – soprattutto – forti con-
tenuti emotivi mediati attraverso analogie cineti-
che. Per questo il suono musicale ha la capacità di 
risvegliare il fantasma delle nostre Urszenen depo-
sitate nell’inconscio, al punto che «[l]a musica ela-
borata dall’Occidente cristiano […] altro non fa che 
rispecchiare affetti appartenenti a scene d’interazio-
ne e offrire loro un containment» (Trapp: 169). Se il 
transfert psicoanalitico corrisponde anch’esso esat-
tamente a questa definizione, resta solo da mera-
vigliarsi che sia stata e ancora sia necessaria tanta 
strada per rompere resistenze idiosincratiche e tabù 
ideologici e istituire infine un dialogo produttivo 
tra questi due mondi.
Indice: 1. Zum Phänomen der Rührung in Psy-
choanalyse und Musik. Ein Gespräch der Heraus-
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geber als Einleitung; 2. Danksagung; 3. H. Gidion: 
«War er ein Tier, da ihn Musik so ergrifft?». Musi-
kalische Erfahrungen zur Sprache gebracht; 4. E. 
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The influential processing fluency theory 
of aesthetic appreciation, articulated by Reber, 
Schwarz and Winkielman (Processing fluency and 
aesthetic pleasure: is beauty in the perceiver’s pro-
cessing experience?, 2004), argues that liking and 
aesthetic pleasure are function of the interpret-
er’s processing dynamics, in particular of the flu-
ency and ease of these processes. Because fluency 
is associated with progress towards a successful 
recognition of stimuli, it is positively marked and 
people very often drawn on their subjective expe-
rience to make evaluative judgment. So, the more 
fluently perceivers can process an object, the more 
positive their aesthetic response. In particular, a 
set of experiments clearly suggests that variables 
able to influence processing fluency (such as per-
ceptual and semantic priming, stimulus repetition, 
symmetry, balance, clarity, and prototypicality) 
increase aesthetic appreciation.
However, there is at least a striking limita-
tion of fluency theory: in a large part of art his-
tory many artists manipulate the ease of pro-
cessing of their works in order to prevent auto-
matic identification, direct attention, and ham-
per straightforward inference. Many artworks 
involve disorder, disorganization, disharmony, 
ambiguity, contradictions, indeterminacy, uncer-
tainty, strangeness, and so on. In recent years an 
innovative frame concerning the link between 
perception and appreciation of art has been pro-
posed by Van de Cruys and Wagemans (Put-
ting Reward in Art: A Tentative Prediction Error 
Account of Visual Art, 2011). The central idea is 
that more often than not great artworks do not 
allow an immediate and easy recognition – so 
that the more fluent the processing, the higher 
the appreciation. On the contrary, they are crea-
tive and innovative, challenging and surprising. 
They inhibit ordinary routines and violate pre-
dictions. However, viewers – with a sufficient 
degree of expertise  – often succeed in establish-
ing a new predictable pattern on a different lev-
el. This transition from an initial state of uncer-
tainty, associated with unpleasant and negative 
affect, to a subsequent state of increased predict-
ability and fluency is highly rewards. In this per-
spective aesthetic pleasure is deeply intertwined 
with knowledge acquisition.
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Recent evidence suggests a crucial relation-
ship between insights and aesthetic pleasure. In 
the study by Muth, Raab and Carbon (2015) par-
ticipants watched and evaluated a stop-motion 
movie depicting evolution and metamorphosis 
of Gestalt. The movie used an intuitive drawing 
technique which allows for the development of 
Gestalt out of arbitrarily set lines to slowly reveal 
order in a seemingly diffuse picture, in particu-
lar through various stages differing only slightly 
in detail. On the basis of a specific method (Con-
tinuous Evaluation Procedure), they assessed lik-
ing, interest, determinacy, and surprise in a very 
time-accurate way, while complexity was computa-
tionally analysed (size of the movie’s frames after 
JPEG compression). Every participant watched 
the movie twice and evaluated it continuously on 
the key dimensions (determinacy, liking, surprise, 
interest). The insight window corresponded to a 
temporal interval containing liking ratings rang-
ing from 60 frames prior to each insight moment 
to 60 frames after that insight moment (note that 
2000 movie frames correspond to about 67s). 
According to Gestalt psychologists, (perceptu-
al) insight was defined as a sudden (strong sur-
prise) and a clear (high determinacy) solution to 
a problem, and it was identified as the peaks of 
determinacy and surprise in Gestalt formation. 
Statistical results showed that during the insight 
window interest already increases 1.500 ms before 
the moment of insight with the peak at 1000 ms, 
supporting the hypothesis that it is evoked by an 
expectation of understanding; there is a strong 
correlation between insight and determinacy and 
between interest and determinacy; sudden insights 
happen only during increases in complexity; above 
all, the increase in liking after an insight moment 
was significantly higher than other changes in lik-
ing during the evaluation of the movie. 
This evidence clearly shows that liking increas-
es after insight, as predicted by the hypothesis 
that aesthetic pleasure is linked to insight. So, it 
is undoubtedly true that in general variables able 
to influence processing fluency increase aesthet-
ic appreciation. However, aesthetic appreciation 
often involves the success in establishing a new 
predictable pattern on a different level and so the 
transition from an initial state of uncertainty to a 
subsequent state of increased predictability, associ-
ated with a positive affective reaction.
Moreover, recent findings suggest that, in order 
to exert phenomenally pleasing processing, the tran-
sition from an initial state of uncertainty to a new 
level of predictability requires cognitive mastering, 
that is deliberate, conscious, top-down controlled 
iterative cycles of extensive elaboration. In the study 
of Belke, Leder and Carbon (2015), in order to cap-
ture preference changes, two kinds of stimuli (eas-
ily processed “fluency” portraits vs. mentally chal-
lenging, ambiguous and indeterminate “mastery” 
portraits with a high stimulation potential) were 
repeatedly evaluated on numerous rating scales that 
foster deeper elaboration of stimulus. The repeated 
evaluations were based on the Repeated Evaluation 
Technique (The Repeated Evaluation Tecnique (RET). 
A Method to Capture Dynamic Effects of Innovative-
ness and Attractiveness, Carbon and Leder 2005). 
Specifically, half of the subjects were assigned to a 
repeated evaluation condition and the other half to 
a familiarity condition, in which participants were 
instructed to attentively look at the portraits without 
any evaluation instruction. Art-inexperienced par-
ticipants showed a preference increase for mastery 
portraits in the repeated evaluation condition from 
a first to second viewing phase. Initial appreciation 
for mastery was lower than for fluency portraits; 
after a repeated evaluation phase preferences for 
mastery portraits increased, while appreciation for 
fluency portraits remained stable over time. No such 
preference gains for mastery portraits were observed 
after the familiarity task. Art-experienced partici-
pants show an increase for mastery portraits in the 
familiarity condition. This suggests that participants 
self-induced elaboration without external encour-
agement.
This evidence shows that the extent to which 
perceiving challenging (and so initially unpleas-
ant) art becomes aesthetically pleasant essential-
ly depends on the viewer’s phenomenal state of 
effort and cognitive mastering, even if sudden and 
intense insights do not occur in this process.
Gianluca Consoli
